

The Logic of Being Informed

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At least since the fifties, logicians and philosophers have been able to formalise "cognitive" relations - especially those of knowing and believing - by means of specific logics, known as modal logics. A wealth of results are now available for epistemic logic (i.e. the logic of "S knows that p") and doxastic logic (i.e. the logic of "S believes that p"). In this paper, a specific logic is proposed in order to formalise the relation of information. More specifically, it is argued that a normal modal logic known as B (or Br), well captures our intuitions concerning what we mean when we say that "S is informed that p". The paper provides a brief and intuitive introduction to normal modal logics, their semantics and axiom systems. It is then shown how information logic may be formalised satisfactorily by means of B, and how it differs from a variety of epistemic/doxastic logics. It is hoped that the new modal logic in question, with the right semantics for the accessibility relation, will be helpful to explain several epistemological issues, including the possibility of a non-doxastic analysis of knowledge for artificial agents.