Title: | Security Analysis of Modern Automotive Key Fobs |
Subject: | Embedded systems, Computer network engineering, Industrial Systems |
Level: | Basic, Advanced |
Description: |
Modern vehicles rely on keyless entry and start systems, where key fobs use low-power wireless communication protocols for command transmission. While these systems enhance user convenience, they introduce several attack surfaces that have been exploited in real-world thefts. Common attack types include relay attacks, replay attacks, rolling-code prediction, and RF signal jamming. These attacks exploit weaknesses in authentication protocols, signal propagation characteristics, and inadequate cryptographic protection in legacy designs. The security of automotive key fobs is a critical aspect of vehicular cybersecurity, as a compromise directly enables unauthorized access and vehicle theft. Despite advances such as challenge–response mechanisms and encrypted transponders, recent studies show that many systems remain vulnerable due to protocol flaws, side-channel leakage, and insufficient entropy in key generation.
This thesis aims to perform a comprehensive security analysis of modern key fob systems from both theoretical and experimental perspectives. It will examine communication protocols, cryptographic mechanisms, and system-level vulnerabilities to identify weak points. For the advanced level, the work will also explore attack-resilient design principles, including improved proximity verification, secure pairing, and lightweight cryptography suitable for resource-constrained embedded systems.
Thesis Tasks:
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Start date: | 2026-01-15 |
End date: | 2026-06-10 |
Prerequisites: |
Background in embedded systems, wireless communication, and cryptography. |
IDT supervisors: | Abbas Arghavani |
Examiner: | Elisabeth Uhlemann |
Comments: |
The thesis offers both theoretical and practical contributions to automotive cybersecurity, aligning with current industry needs for secure-by-design vehicular systems. |
Company contact: |